ABSTRACT: Based on a close reading of new archival material, this article makes a case for the adoption of an empirical, 'sub-systemic' approach to the study of nationalist and postcolonial politics in Zambia. By exploring the notion of popular 'expectations of independence' to a much greater degree than did previous studies, the paper contends that the extent of UNIP's political hegemony in the immediate post-independence era has been grossly overrated -even in a traditional rural stronghold of the party and during a favourable economic cycle. In the second part of the paper, the diplomatic and ethnic manoeuvres of the ruler of the eastern Lunda kingdom of Kazembe are set against a background of increasing popular disillusionment with the performance of the independent government.
INTRODUCTION
Owing to the dearth of primary sources available for study and to shifting historiographical trends and fashions, present-day historians of south-central Africa have proved reluctant to engage with Zambia's nationalist and post-colonial trajectories.
1 This paper ought to be seen as a modest contribution to the rectification of this scholarly neglect. 2 As elsewhere in Africa, 'sub-systemic' approach to the study of nationalist and post-colonial politics in Zambia.
Two specific contributions descend from this general premise. The case of the Luapula province calls into question the UNIP-centred narrative which has prevailed among students of Zambian politics since independence. The argument which is often made or alluded to in the specialist literature is that it was only the economic recession of the early 1970s that weakened the developmentalist project of the 'people's party' and seriously threatened its hitherto secure political hegemony. Until then, UNIP had, so to speak, delivered. 
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The appeal to personal past militancy was not the only reason why the claims of local party officials proved hard to dismiss; cautious leaders were also alive to the potential political costs of thwarted ambition. In October 1964, for instance, Chilufya Linso, the one- were in the hands of members of the royal family appointed during the previous thirty years. 40 In virtue of its executive and legislative powers, the LNA became the instrument through which all further absolutist moves on the kings' part would be sanctioned and implemented.
While straining the relationships between eastern Lunda royals and aristocrats, the selfaggrandizing strategy pursued by the Mwata Kazembes in the first half of the twentieth century did not seriously affect the bulk of the kingdom's inhabitants, who appear to have done nothing to forestall it. More significant in determining their continuing allegiance to the royal family was the discreet populist posture adopted by the kings and other territorial leaders throughout most of the colonial era. As shown by Chipungu, Northern Rhodesian The king was also said to have requested his Katangese allies to provide him with both weapons and 'magic powers that can stop guns or bullets from getting into the flesh of humans.' 53 In 'Mulenga', to which he had proceeded after his stopover in Chibondo, the Mwata had met at least three important chiefs of the south-western shores of lake Mweru and advised them to be 'very lenient' when 'Nkumbula people' crossed the border into Zambia.
Paul Kanyembo had then reiterated his 'confidence in this Congo Government, which [was was also a function of UNIP's continuing inability to match the Luapulans' expectations for a better tomorrow. As UNIP failed to deliver its 'promises to freedom fighters' and faced the charge that 'the slogan that "it pays to be UNIP 
